STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE’S CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

IN VIOLATION OF AMENDMENTS 1, 9 AND 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO FOUR PETITIONS FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.

Foremost among the tools we, the People, have in our possession to defend our Rights is the unalienable Right to Petition for a Redress of our Grievances. Constitution, 1^stAmendment.
In America, the right to petition our government for a redress of grievances is the basis of our liberty. Our founders explicitly recognized this right in the first amendment to our constitution -- for they understood that without it, we could not have a servant government whose power is defined and limited by the consent of the people.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states clearly and unambiguously: "Congress shall make NO law …abridging …the right of the people … to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
The government is operating outside the boundaries the People have drawn around its powers.
These are some of our grievances.

First: In violation of the War Powers Clauses of the Constitution, the President has colluded with the Congress to pass legislation that authorizes the President to apply the armed forces of the United States of America in hostilities in Iraq without a congressional Declaration of War.

Second: In a hasty response to widespread fear and panic following 9/11, our elected representatives voted on the "U.S.A. Patriot Act" (with many having not read it), which by the plain language of the Act, violates and seizes a number of the unalienable rights of the People.

Third: Our government has relinquished direct control of the monetary system of this nation to a privately owned central bank and has transformed our money into nothing but limitless debt. And, a significant portion of the Federal Reserve stock is held by foreign entities.

And Fourth: the U.S. Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service reneged on their July 2001 agreement to appear at a public forum to answer the People’s Petition – their Remonstrance and well-documented legal charges directly asserting the lack of statutory or Constitutional authority for the federal income tax and the systemic abuses of unalienable rights in the daily operations of the IRS.
On October 7, 2002, we have posted on our website four Petitions for Redress of these grievances.
On November 8, 2002, the four Petitions, signed by thousands of American citizens who reside in most if not all 435 Congressional Districts, were hand delivered to the offices of each member of the House of Representatives and each member of the Senate.
On November 12, 2002, the Petitions were each formally served on President Bush.
The Petitions address specific constitutional grievances relating to: 1) the War Powers Clauses of the Constitution and the Iraq Resolution; 2) the privacy, due process and free speech clauses of the Constitution and the USA Patriot Act; 3) the money clauses of the Constitution and the Federal Reserve System; and 4) the tax-related clauses of the Constitution and the federal Income Tax system.
With the exception of the Income Tax Petition, the Petitions for Redress include specific questions, which We, the People have the expected to be answered. We, the People have an unalienable Right to freedom from a government that does not respond to proper Petitions for Redress.
With respect to the Income Tax Petition, we were further along. Our questions have already gone unanswered by the government following its receipt of an earlier Petition for Redress regarding the fraudulent origin of the income tax system and its illegal operation. The current, our second, Petition on the Income Tax Grievances moved the petitioning process to the next level with its list of demands. There is more to the petitioning process than the mere submittal of the Founders referred to as the "despised" petitions.
The Petitions respectfully requested each congressperson and the President to send a representative to meet with a very large delegation representing the People from all 50 states and most if not all 435 Congressional Districts at 2 P.M., on November 14, 2002, on the National Mall, to either answer the questions OR to tell the People when the questions will be answered. Hundreds of people from nearly every state in the union were there, most having driven in caravans, to await the government’s response to the Petitions for Redress.
With the government’s failure to respond, we can see a clear Pattern; our elected representatives do not feel compelled to honor their oaths of office, to respect the Constitution, to respond to the People.
We must now take the appropriate next step.
As of November 14, 2002, the government has left us no choice but to engage in civil action – a pro-active, non-violent mass movement, with the explicit goal of restoring the Republic by bringing the government back under the control of the People and our Rule Book – the Constitution of the United States of America.
The Right of Redress of Grievances includes the right of Redress Before payment of Taxes.
This Right of Redress Before Taxes lies in the hands of the People.
This Right is the People’s non-violent, peaceful means to procuring a remedy to their grievances without having to depend on – or place their trust in -- the government’s willingness to respond to the People’s petitions and without having to resort to violence.
As our Founding Fathers explicitly noted, retaining and keeping in our possession the money that we would otherwise have turned over to the government is the only real practical, non-violent method to corral those that have seized power from the People without the People’s consent:

"If money is wanted by Rulers who have in any manner oppressed the People, [the People] may retain [their money] until their grievances are redressed, and thus peaceably procure relief, without trusting to despised petitions or disturbing the public tranquility."

(See, "Continental Congress To The Inhabitants Of The Province Of Quebec." Journals of the Continental Congress. 1774 -1789. Journals 1: 105-13.)

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

THE INCOME TAX IS A TAX ON LABOR, PROHIBITED BY THE 13^TH AMENDMENT

It was the intent of Congress to require "individuals" to make income tax returns based upon receipt of more than a threshold amount of gross income even if the individual ends up not "liable for" a tax on that gross income. [See 26 U.S.C. 6012 (a).]

The "gross income" mentioned in Section 6012 of the Internal Revenue Code is the "gross income" as set forth at Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 61(a) and 6012.)

Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" as "all income" from whatever source derived, but does not define "income." [See 26 U.S.C. º 61(a)]

In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude what "income" is, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised. [See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920)]

The definition of income as it appears in Section 61(a) is based upon the 16th Amendment and that the word is used in its constitutional sense. House Report No. 1337; Senate Report No. 1622; U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, pages 4155 and 4802, respectively, 1954.

The United States Supreme Court has defined the term income for purposes of all income tax legislation as: The gain derived from capital, from labor or from both combined, provided it include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. [See Stratton’s Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchant’s Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)]

The United States Supreme Court defined "income" to mean the following:

"…Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities."

[See Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467 (1918) (emphasis added)].

"This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation…Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389, 31 Sup.Ct.Rep. 342, Ann. Cas."

[See Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 414, 58 L.Ed. 285, 34 Sup.Ct. 136 (1913) (emphasis added)].

The term "corporation" as used above infers a federally chartered and not a state chartered corporation.

The United States Government is defined as a federal corporation:

United States Code

TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

PART VI - PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

CHAPTER 176 - FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE

SUBCHAPTER A - DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 3002. Definitions

(15) ''United States'' means -

(A) a Federal corporation;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or

(See 26 U.S.C. 3002)

Individuals as defined in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code and in 26 CFR §1.1441-1 are not federal corporations, and therefore cannot have "profit" or "gain" as constitutionally defined above.(See 26 CFR 1.1441-1)

In the absence of gain, there is no "income." [See Stratton’s Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchant’s Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)]

There is a difference between gross receipts and gross income. (See Common knowledge)

The United States Supreme Court recognizes that one’s labor constitutes property. (See Stratton’s Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchant’s Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921).) (Ex. 065, 066, 067, 054, 068.)

The United States Supreme Court stated in Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (concurring opinion of Justice Fields) (1883), that:

It has been well said that, "The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable."

The United States Supreme Court recognizes that contracts of employment constitute property. [See Stratton’s Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchant’s Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (concurring opinion of Justice Fields) (1883)]

The United States Supreme Court stated in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1914) that: "The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property--partaking of the nature of each--is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property."

The United States Supreme Court recognizes that a contract for labor is a contract for the sale of property. [See Stratton’s Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1920); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchant’s Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (concurring opinion of Justice Fields) (1883).]

The United States Supreme Court has stated in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) that:

In our opinion that section, in the particular mentioned, is an invasion of the personal liberty, as well as of the right of property, guaranteed by that Amendment (5th Amendment). Such liberty and right embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of others and equally the right to make contracts for the sale of one’s own labor.

Congress recognizes at Section 64 of the Internal Revenue Code that "ordinary income" is a gain from the sale or exchange of property. (See 26 U.S.C. 64.)

Internal Revenue Code Sections 1001, 1011 and 1012 provide the method Congress has set forth for determining the gain derived from the sale of property. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1001, 1011, and 1012.)

Section 1001(a) states that: "The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized there from over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain . . . ." [See 26 U.S.C. º 1001(a)]

Section 1001(b) states that: "The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received." [See 26 U.S.C. 1001(b)]

Section 1011 states that: "The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis (determined under section 1012...), adjusted as provided in section 1016." (See 26 U.S.C. 1011.)

Section 1012 states that: "The basis of property shall be the cost of such property . . . ." (See 26 U.S.C. 1012.)

The cost of property purchased under contract is its fair market value as evidenced by the contract itself, provided neither the buyer nor seller were acting under compulsion in entering into the contract, and both were fully aware of all of the facts regarding the contract. [See Terrance Development Co. v. C.I.R., 345 F.2d 933 (1965); Bankers Trust Co. v. U.S., 518 F.2d 1210 (1975); Bar L. Ranch. Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (1970); Jack Daniel Distillery v. U.S., 379 F.2d 569 (1967); In re Williams’ Estate, 256 F.2d 217 (1958)].

In the case of the sale of labor, none of the provisions of Section 1016 of the Internal Revenue Code are applicable. (See 26 U.S.C. 1016.)

When an employer pays the employee the amount agreed upon by their contract, there is no excess amount realized over the adjusted basis, and thus no gain under Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 1001.)

If one has no gain, one would have no income in a constitutional sense. (See 26 U.S.C. 64) (26 U.S.C.1001)

If one has no income, one would have no "gross income."

In the absence of "gross income," one would not be required to make a return under Section 6012 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 6012.)

Section 6017 of the Internal Revenue Code requires individuals, other than nonresident alien individuals, to make a return if they have net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more. (See 26 U.S.C. 6017.)

The term "net earnings from self-employment" is defined at Section 1402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as follows:

"The term ‘net earnings from self-employment’ means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual . . . ." [See 26 U.S.C. 1402(a)]

In the absence of "gross income," one would not have more than $400 of "net earnings from self-employment." [See 26 U.S.C. 1402(a)]

The "taxable income" upon which the income tax is imposed in Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code is defined at Section 63 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 63.)

The term "taxable income" is defined differently for those who itemize deductions and those who don’t itemize deductions.

For those who do itemize deductions, the term "taxable income" means "gross income" minus the deductions allowed by Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than the standard deduction.

For those who do not itemize deductions, the term "taxable income" means "adjusted gross income" minus the standard deduction and the deduction or personal exemptions provided in section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 151.)

For individuals, the term "adjusted gross income" means gross income minus certain deductions.

In the absence of "gross income" an individual would have no "adjusted gross income" and no "taxable income."

In the absence of taxable income, no tax is imposed under Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 1.)

Employment taxes are contained in Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code. (See Title 26, United States Code, index.)

The taxes imposed in Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code are different than the taxes imposed in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. (See Title 26, United States Code, index.)

The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax contained in Subtitle C at Section 3101 of the Internal Revenue Code is imposed on the individual’s "income." (See 26 U.S.C. 3101.)

The rate of the tax set out at Section 3101 of the Internal Revenue Code is a percentage of the individual’s wages. (See 26 U.S.C. 3101.)

The term "income" as used at Section 3101 of the Internal Revenue Code is the same income as used in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 3101; Title 26, United States Code, index.)

If one has no income, one is not subject to the tax imposed at Section 3101 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 3101.) (Ex. 093.)

The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax on employers contained in Subtitle C at Section 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code is an excise tax on employers with respect to their having employees. (See 26 U.S.C. 3111.)

At Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, employers are directed to withhold from wages paid to employees, a tax determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. (See 26 U.S.C. 3402.)

Congress does not identify the Section 3402 "tax determined" as either a direct tax, an indirect tax, and/or an "income" tax. (See 26 U.S.C. 3402.)

Congress made the employer liable for the Section 3402 tax at Section 3403 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 3402 and 3403.)

At Section 3501 of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to collect the taxes imposed in Subtitle C and pay them into the Treasury of the United States as internal revenue collections. (See 26 U.S.C. 3501.)

Congress has not anywhere imposed the tax described at Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See Title 26, United States Code, in its entirety.)

At Section 31 of the Internal Revenue Code, the amount of the Section 3402 tax on wages is allowed as a credit against the income tax imposed in Subtitle A. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 31.)

If one does not have any tax imposed at Subtitle A for any reason whatsoever, the law enacted by Congress at Section 3402(n) of the Internal Revenue Code constitutes an exemption of the tax described at Section 3402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 3402.)

A typical American family works until noon of every working day just to pay its alleged tax obligations. (See "Compilation of Tax Facts" by freelance writer John NacIntyre, published in Southwest Airlines Spirit Magazine, 1999 ed., v. 4, hereinafter "Tax Facts," p. 154.)

The typical American family pays more in taxes than they spend on food, clothing, and housing combined. (See Tax Facts.)

There are currently over 480 tax forms. (See Tax Facts.)

The federal tax code contains over 7 million words. (See Tax Facts.)

Over 1/2 of Americans are paying some sort of tax professional to help them comply with alleged tax law requirements. (See Tax Facts.)

Each year the Internal Revenue Service sends out approximately 8 billion pages of tax forms and instructions, generating enough paper to stretch 28 times around the Earth.

Americans spend approximately 5.4 billion labor hours and $200 billion dollars per year attempting to comply with alleged tax requirements, which is more time and money than it takes to produce every car, truck, and van each year in the United States. (See Tax Facts.)

In 1913, the average American family had to work only until January 30th before earning enough to pay all alleged tax obligations. (See Tax Facts.)

The average American family had to work all the way through May 12th in order to pay their alleged federal, state, and local tax bills for the year 2000. (See Tax Facts.)

Economist Daniel J. Mitchell recently observed that: "[Medieval serfs] only had to give the lord of the manor a third of their output and they were considered slaves. So what does that make us?" (See "Legalized Loot" by Machan)

The average Wisconsin citizen had to work until May 9th this year to pay all alleged tax obligations. (See Tax Facts.)

Americans own less of their labor than feudal serfs.

The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." (See U.S. Const. amend XIII.)

If Congress can constitutionally tax a man’s labor at the rate of 1%, then Congress is free, subject only to legislative discretion, to tax that man’s labor at the rate of 100%.

"Peonage" is a condition of servitude compelling a man or woman or woman to perform labor in order to pay off a debt. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., West Publishing Co. 1990, p. 1135.)

The Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, within a few months of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment that allegedly authorized a tax on the incomes of most Americans.

The Federal Reserve Act allowed the U.S. government to borrow large sums of money from private banking institutions at interest, and thereby potentially create a large public debt.

U.S. Congress' inability to balance the federal budget or lack of fiscal discipline could create large volumes of public debt to the Federal Reserve.

The result of increasing public debt must be an increase in income tax revenues to pay off the debt in order to maintain solvency of the federal government.

An increase in income tax revenues would require a larger percentage of the wage (labor) income of average Americans to be extracted as income tax, because more than half of federal income tax revenues derive from personal income taxes rather than corporate income taxes.

There is an incentive for politicians to buy votes with borrowed money that will be paid off by unborn children at interest.

Requiring unborn children of tomorrow paying off extravagances of today at interest amounts to taxation without representation, which was the very reason our country rebelled from Great Britain to become an independent nation.

Thomas Jefferson, one of our founding fathers and author of our Declaration of Independence, said the following

"I sincerely believe... that banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies, and that the principle of spending money to be paid by posterity under the name of funding is but swindling futurity on a large scale." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1816. ME 15:23

"Funding I consider as limited, rightfully, to a redemption of the debt within the lives of a majority of the generation contracting it; every generation coming equally, by the laws of the Creator of the world, to the free possession of the earth He made for their subsistence, unencumbered by their predecessors, who, like them, were but tenants for life." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1816. ME 15:18

"[The natural right to be free of the debts of a previous generation is] a salutary curb on the spirit of war and indebtment, which, since the modern theory of the perpetuation of debt, has drenched the earth with blood, and crushed its inhabitants under burdens ever accumulating." --Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1813. ME 13:272

"We believe--or we act as if we believed--that although an individual father cannot alienate the labor of his son, the aggregate body of fathers may alienate the labor of all their sons, of their posterity, in the aggregate, and oblige them to pay for all the enterprises, just or unjust, profitable or ruinous, into which our vices, our passions or our personal interests may lead us. But I trust that this proposition needs only to be looked at by an American to be seen in its true point of view, and that we shall all consider ourselves unauthorized to saddle posterity with our debts, and morally bound to pay them ourselves; and consequently within what may be deemed the period of a generation, or the life of the majority." --Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1813. ME 13:357

"It is incumbent on every generation to pay its own debts as it goes. A principle which if acted on would save one-half the wars of the world." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1820. FE 10:175

"To preserve [the] independence [of the people,] we must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy and liberty, or profusion and servitude. If we run into such debts as that we must be taxed in our meat and in our drink, in our necessaries and our comforts, in our labors and our amusements, for our callings and our creeds, as the people of England are, our people, like them, must come to labor sixteen hours in the twenty-four, give the earnings of fifteen of these to the government for their debts and daily expenses, and the sixteenth being insufficient to afford us bread, we must live, as they now do, on oatmeal and potatoes, have no time to think, no means of calling the mismanagers to account, but be glad to obtain subsistence by hiring ourselves to rivet their chains on the necks of our fellow-sufferers." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816. ME 15:39
With an unlimited source of credit in the Federal Reserve, and an ability to claim any percentage of the income of the Average American in income taxes, the growth of the federal government and the smothering and complete extinguishment of liberty is inevitable given the vagaries and weaknesses of the humankind who occupy public office.
"Peonage" is a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. [See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 201 (1905)]
The U.S. Congress abolished peonage in 1867. (See 42 U.S.C. 1994; R.S. Section 1990, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 187, Section 1, 14 Stat. 546.)
Holding or returning any person to a condition of peonage is a crime under 18 U.S.C. 1581. (See 18 U.S.C. 1581)
Involuntary servitude means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for another by use or threat of physical restraint or injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or legal process. [See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 201 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1910); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)]
If an American stops turning over the fruits of his or her labor to the federal government in the form of income tax payments, he suffers under the risk of possible criminal prosecution and incarceration. (See Form 1040 Instruction Booklet)

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

CONGRESS LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE AN INCOME TAX ON THE PEOPLE EXCEPT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THE US TERRITORIES AND IN THOSE AREAS WITHIN ANY OF THE 50 STATES WHERE THE STATES HAVE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED IT, IN WRITING.

At Section 7608(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress set forth the authority of internal revenue officers with respect to enforcement of Subtitle E and other laws pertaining to liquor, tobacco, and firearms. [(See 26 U.S.C. 7608(a)]

At Section 7608(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress set forth the authority of internal revenue officers with respect to enforcement of laws relating to internal revenue other than Subtitle E. [See 26 U.S.C. 7608(b)]

The only persons authorized to enforce Subtitle A are special agents and investigators. [See 26 U.S.C. 7608(b)]

The term "person" as that term is used in Internal Revenue Code Section 6001 and 6011 is defined at Section 7701(a)(1). [See 26 U.S.C. 6001, 6011, and 7701(a)(1)]

Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(a)(1) states: "The term person shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation." [(See 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1)]
Trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies and corporations do not have arms and legs, do not get married, do not eat, drink and sleep, and are not otherwise included in what one not trained in the law would recognize as a "person."
Internal Revenue Code Section 6012(a) states that: "(a)General Rule. Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the following: (1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount or more . . . ." [(See 26 U.S.C. 6012(a)]
Internal Revenue Code Section 1 imposes a tax on the taxable income of certain "persons" who are "individuals" and "estates and trusts." (See 26 U.S.C. 1.)
The "individual" mentioned in Internal Revenue Code Section 6012 is the same individual as mentioned in Internal Revenue Code Section 1. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 6012.)
The "individual" mentioned by Congress in Internal Revenue Code Section 6012 and Internal Revenue Code Section 1 is not defined anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1.1 and 6012; Title 26, United States Code, in its entirety.)
26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 is the Treasury Regulation that corresponds to Internal Revenue Code Section 1. (See 26 U.S.C. 1; 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1.)
At 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a)(1), the individuals identified at Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code are those individuals who are either citizens of the United States, residents of the United States, or non-resident aliens. [See 26 U.S.C. 1.1; 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a)(1)]
The "residents" and "citizens" identified in 26 C.F.R. 1.1- 1(a)(1) are mutually exclusive classes. [See 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a)(1)]
As used in 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1-1, the term "resident" means an alien. (See 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1.)
26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c) states that: "Every person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is a citizen." [See 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c)]
A person who is born or naturalized in the United States but not subject to its jurisdiction, is not a citizen within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1. (See 26 U.S.C. 1.1-1)
On April 21, 1988, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division, in the case of United States v. James I. Hall, Case No. EV 87-20-CR, IRS Revenue Officer Patricia A. Schaffner, testified under penalties of perjury that the terms "subject to its jurisdiction" as used at 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c) meant being subject to the laws of the country, and that meant the "legislative jurisdiction" of the United States. (See "Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax," Jeffrey A. Dickstein, J.D., Custom Prints 1990, Appendix B, pp. 309-357.)
In the same case, Patricia A. Schaffner testified under oath the term "subject to its jurisdiction" could have no other meaning than the "legislative jurisdiction" of the United States. (See "Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax," Jeffrey A. Dickstein, J.D., Custom Prints 1990, Appendix B, pp. 309-357.)
When Patricia A. Schaffner was asked to tell the jury what facts made Mr. Hall subject to the "legislative jurisdiction" of the United States, the prosecutor, Assistant United States Attorney Larry Mackey objected, and the court sustained the objection. (See "Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax," Jeffrey A. Dickstein, J.D., Custom Prints 1990, Appendix B, pp. 309-357.)
The Internal Revenue Service is never required by the Federal courts to prove facts to establish whether one is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (See "Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax," Jeffrey A. Dickstein, J.D., Custom Prints 1990, Appendix B, pp. 309-357.)
The United States Department of Justice and United States Attorneys, and their assistants, always object when an alleged taxpayer demands the Government prove that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and the federal courts always sustain those objections, which means that the federal courts routinely prohibit the introduction of potentially exculpatory evidence in tax crime trials.
The IRS has been directed to maintain a system of financial records on all federal judges, all IRS Criminal Investigation Division Special Agents, and all U.S. Attorneys, which records cannot be accessed by the subject(s) under the FOIA or Privacy Act. ( See Treasury System of Records 46.002 as identified in Treasury/IRS Privacy Act of 1974 Resource Document #6372)
Unless specifically provided for in the United States Constitution, the federal government does not have legislative jurisdiction in the states. [See United States v. Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995)]
40 U.S.C. §255 identifies the only method by which the federal government may acquire legislative jurisdiction over a geographic area within the outer limits of a state of the Union, which is by state cession in writing. (See 40 U.S.C. §255.)
On December 15, 1954, an interdepartmental committee was commissioned on the recommendation of the Attorney General of the United States, Herbert Brownell, Jr., and approved by President Eisenhower and his cabinet, named the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, and charged with the duty of studying and reporting where the United States had legal authority to make someone subject to its jurisdiction. (See "Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States," April 1956, hereinafter "the Report.")
In June of 1957, the "Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States" issued "Part II" of its report entitled "Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States." (See Report, p. 197.)
The Report makes the following statements:

a. "The Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of Federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction -- by State consent under Article I, section 8, clause 17... Justice McLean suggested that the Constitution provided the sole mode for transfer of jurisdiction, and that if this mode is not pursued, no transfer of jurisdiction can take place." (See Report, p. 41.)

b. "It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of jurisdiction (1) pursuant to clause 17 by a Federal acquisition of land with State consent, or (2) by cession from the State to the Federal Government, or unless the Federal Government has reserved jurisdiction upon the admission of the State, the Federal Government possesses no legislative jurisdiction over any area within a State, such jurisdiction being for exercise by the State, subject to non- interference by the State with Federal functions," (See Report, p. 45.)

c. "The Federal Government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any area within the exterior boundaries of a State," (See Report, p. 46.)

d. "On the other hand, while the Federal Government has power under various provisions of the Constitution to define, and prohibit as criminal, certain acts or omissions occurring anywhere in the United States, it has no power to punish for various other crimes, jurisdiction over which is retained by the States under our Federal-State system of government, unless such crime occurs on areas as to which legislative jurisdiction has been vested in the Federal Government." (See Report, p.107.)
The phrase "subject to their jurisdiction" as used in the Thirteenth Amendment means subject to both the jurisdiction of the several states of the union and the United States. (See U.S. Const. Amendment 13.)
The "subject to its jurisdiction" component of the definition of citizen set out at 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c) has a different meaning than the phrase "subject to their jurisdiction" as used in the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (See 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c); U.S. Const. amend 13.)
The term "foreign" is nowhere defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
The term "foreign" means anything outside of the legislative jurisdiction of the Congress, which means anything outside of federal property ceded, in most cases, to the federal government by the states as required by 40 U.S.C. §255. (See 40 U.S.C. §255.)
A Treasury Regulation cannot create affirmative duties not otherwise imposed by Congress in the underlying statute, corresponding Internal Revenue Code section. [See C.I.R. v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 89 (1959); U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358-359 (1957)]
Congress defined a "taxpayer" at Section 7701(a)(14) of the Internal Revenue Code, as any person subject to any Internal Revenue tax. [See 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(14)]
"Subject to" is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1425 as:

"Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; provided that; provided; answerable for." Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650, 136 S.W.2d 289, 302

(See Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1425)
Based on the above definition of "subject to", use of the term "taxpayer" in describing anyone creates a presumption of liability for tax on the part of the person being referred to.
The IRS uses the term "taxpayer" to refer to everyone, including those not necessarily subject to or liable for Subtitle A income taxes.
In Botta v. Scanlon, 288 F.2d. 504, 508 (1961), a federal court said:

"A reasonable construction of the taxing statutes does not include vesting any tax official with absolute power of assessment against individuals not specified in the states as a person liable for the tax without an opportunity for judicial review of this status before the appellation of 'taxpayer' is bestowed upon them and their property is seized..."
Based on the above, it is a violation of due process and a violation of delegated authority for any IRS tax official to refer to any person as a "taxpayer" who does not first identify him or herself as such voluntarily.
The federal courts, in the case of Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922) stated at 238:

"The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws..."

"The distinction between persons and things within the scope of the revenue laws and those without is vital."
One who is not a citizen, resident, or non-resident alien, is not an individual subject to the tax imposed by Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. (See 26 U.S.C. 1; 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1.)
An individual who is not subject to the tax imposed by Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, is not an individual required to make a return under the Requirement of Internal Revenue Code Section 6012. (See 26 U.S.C. Sections 1.1 and 6012.)
The Supreme Court, in the dissenting opinion of Judge Harlan in the case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), stated:

"The idea prevails with some, indeed it has found expression in arguments at the bar, that we have in this country substantially two national governments; one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all of its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside the independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers [of absolutism] as other nations of the earth are accustomed to…I take leave to say that, if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of government will result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism. It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution."
The jurisdiction that Honorable Justice Harlan above was referring to where "legislative absolutism" would or could reign was in areas subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the U.S. government, which includes the District of Columbia, federal enclaves within the states, and U.S. territories and possessions.
The Internal Revenue Manual says the following, in Section 4.10.7.2.9.8 (05-14-1999):

Importance of Court Decisions

Decisions made at various levels of the court system are considered to be interpretations of tax laws and may be used by either examiners or taxpayers to support a position.

Certain court cases lend more weight to a position than others. A case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court becomes the law of the land and takes precedence over decisions of lower courts. The Internal Revenue Service must follow Supreme Court decisions. For examiners, Supreme Court decisions have the same weight as the Code.

Decisions made by lower courts, such as Tax Court, District Courts, or Claims Court, are binding on the Service only for the particular taxpayer and the years litigated. Adverse decisions of lower courts do not require the Service to alter its position for other taxpayers.
The Internal Revenue Service, in its responsive letters to tax payers, routinely and chronically violates the above requirements by citing cases below the Supreme Court level, which do not apply to more than the individual taxpayer in question according to the above.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

IRS IS PROHIBITED BY THE 4^TH AND 5^TH AMENDMENTS FROM COMPELLING PEOPLE TO SIGN AND FILE AN INCOME TAX RETURN FORM 1040

26 U.S.C. 6001 requires the keeping of records.

26 U.S.C. 7203 makes it a federal crime not to keep the records required under section 6001.

The records required under 26 U.S.C. 6001 contain information that will appear on the tax returns pertaining to federal income taxes.

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling an American to be a witness against himself.

The IRS currently uses the following: Non-Custodial Miranda warning:

"In connection with my investigation of your tax liability I would like to ask you some questions. However, first I advise you that under the fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information. If such answers or information might tend to incriminate you in any way, I also advise you that anything which you say and any documents which you submit may be used against you in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding."

(See IRS Handbook for Special Agents.)

The Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act notices currently used by the IRS provides that the information provided in the preparation of a tax return can go to the Department of Justice who prosecutes criminal cases against the filers of tax returns. (See IRS Form 1040 and Instruction Booklet.)

The United States Attorneys’ Bulletin, April 1998 edition, contained an article written by Joan Bainbridge Safford, Deputy United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, entitled: "Follow That Lead! Obtaining and Using Tax Information in a Non-Tax Case," hereinafter "Follow that Lead!".

"Follow that Lead!" states the following:

"In any criminal case where financial gain is the prominent motive, tax returns and return information can provide some of the most significant leads, corroborative evidence, and cross-examination material obtainable from any source."

"Follow that Lead!" states the following;

"In even the most straightforward fraud case, the usefulness of tax returns should be apparent . . . the tax return information provides a statement under penalty of perjury which may either serve as circumstantial evidence of the target’ misrepresentation of his economic status or as helpful cross-examination material . . . Disclosure of tax returns may also provide critical leads and impeachment material."

The Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice set out in the IRS Form 1040 Instruction Booklet states the following:

"[W]e may disclose your tax information to the Department of Justice, to enforce the tax laws, both civil and criminal, and to cities, states, the District of Columbia, U.S. Commonwealths or possessions, and certain foreign governments to carry out their tax laws."

Tax returns are used by the IRS to develop civil and criminal cases against the filers of the tax returns. (See "Follow that Lead!")

Tax returns of a filer are used as evidence against the filer in both civil and criminal income tax cases. (See Annotations, Title 26, Sections 7201,7203)

The United States Supreme Court has held that a fifth amendment privilege exists against requiring a person to admit or deny he has documents which the government believes is related to the federal income tax. [See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)]

The Fifth Amendment provides an absolute defense to tax crimes. (See United States v. Heise, 709 F.2d 449, 450 (6th Cir. 1983); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1976).)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10^th Circuit took the position in U.S. v. Conklin, (1994), WL 504211, that the filing of an income tax return (Form 1040) is not compelled and, therefore, the principle that no one may be forced to waive their 5^th Amendment rights in order to comply with a law is not applicable to federal income tax returns. (See U.S. v. Conklin, (1994), WL 504211)

The Supreme Court has held that if one wants to assert the Fifth Amendment to an issue pertaining to a federal income tax return, one must make that claim on the form itself. (Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).)

If one claims Fifth Amendment protection on an income tax form, that act can result in criminal prosecution for failure to file income tax returns, income tax evasion, or conspiracy to defraud. [See United States v. Waldeck, 909 F.2d 555, 561 (1st Cir. 1990)]

The Paperwork Reduction Act Notice (the "Notice") set out in the IRS Form 730 states that:

"You must file Form 730 and pay the tax on wagers under section 4401(a) if you: Are in the business of accepting wagers, or Conduct a wagering pool or lottery."

The Notice states the following:

[C]ertain documents related to wagering taxes and information obtained through them that relates to wagering taxes may not be used against the taxpayer in any criminal proceeding. See section 4424 for more details.

In 1997, 5,335 tax audits resulted in criminal investigations of those tax filers. (Speculation: Tax Facts, etc.)

Judge Learned Hand stated that:

Logically, indeed, he (the taxpayer) is boxed in a paradox for he must prove the criminatory character of what it is his privilege to suppress just because it is criminatory. The only practicable solution is to be content with the door’s being set a little ajar, AND WHILE AT TIMES THIS NO DOUBT PARTIALLY DESTROYS THE PRIVILEGE, ...nothing better is available.

(See United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (1947) (emphasis added).)

The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land.

The American people do not have to tolerate an income tax system in which the federal government requires a citizen to give up any constitutional rights.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

PERSONAL INCOME TAXES POLARIZE AND DIVIDE AN OTHERWISE UNITED NATION AND PROMOTE CLASS WARFARE AND MISTRUST OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

The second plank in the Communist Manifesto calls for a heavy, progressive (graduated) income tax not unlike what we have now with the IRS form 1040, which punishes the rich so that wealth may be redistributed to the poor.
The U.S. Constitution requires that all income taxes must be uniform as follows, from in Article 1, Section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which says:

"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;"
To be uniform, a tax must apply equally to all persons similarly situated and all property of the same type or class being taxed must be taxed at the same percentage rate, no matter where people live, where the property is, or how much taxable income the person makes. Otherwise, the tax discriminates against the rich.
The Supreme Court stated in the case of Pollack v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) that:

"Congress has the exclusive power of selecting the class. It has regulated that particular branch of commerce which concerns the bringing of alien passengers,' and that taxes shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by law. The object of this provision was to prevent unjust discriminations. It prevents property from being classified, and taxed as classed, by different rules. All kinds of property must be taxed uniformly or be entirely exempt. The uniformity must be coextensive with the territory to which the tax applies.

Mr. Justice Miller, in his lectures on the constitution, 1889-1890 ( pages 240, 241), said of taxes levied by congress: ‘The tax must be uniform on the particular article; and it is uniform, within the meaning of the constitutional requirement, if it is made to bear the same percentage over all the United States. That is manifestly the meaning of this word, as used in this clause. The framers of the constitution could not have meant to say that the government, in raising its revenues, should not be allowed to discriminate between the articles which it should tax.’ In discussing generally the requirement of uniformity found in state constitutions, he said: ‘The difficulties in the way of this construction have, however, been very largely obviated by the meaning of the word [157 U.S. 429, 595] 'uniform,' which has been adopted, holding that the uniformity must refer to articles of the same class; that is, different articles may be taxed at different amounts, provided the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere, with all people, and at all times.’

One of the learned counsel puts it very clearly when he says that the correct meaning of the provisions requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be 'uniform throughout the United States' is that the law imposing them should 'have an equal and uniform application in every part of the Union.'

If there were any doubt as to the intention of the states to make the grant of the right to impose indirect taxes subject to the condition that such taxes shall be in all respects uniform and impartial, that doubt, as said by counsel, should be resolved in the interest of justice, in favor of the taxpayer."
The article being taxed in the case of Subtitle A income taxes is dollar bills, or "income" as constitutionally defined.
In order to meet the uniformity requirement, every dollar bill (the article being taxed) taxed must be taxed at the same rate and not in a way that is based on the income of the person receiving it, because this would amount to discrimination according to the Supreme Court as listed above.
Because graduated income taxes violate the uniformity requirement of the Constitution, they must be voluntary, because the government cannot by legislation compel its citizens to violate the Constitution.
The Supreme Court stated the following about the nature of income taxes in general, and that neither of these two cases has ever been overruled:

"To lay with one hand the power of government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it on favored individuals.. is none the less robbery because it is.. called taxation."

Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)

"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another." U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
All entitlement programs, including Welfare, Social Security, FICA, etc, fall into the class of taxes identified in U.S. v. Butler that are "expropriations of money from one group for the benefit of another."
Using income taxes to redistribute income or property between social classes or persons within society makes the U.S. into a socialist country:

"socialism 1. : any of various economic political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods. 2. a: a system of society or group living in which there is no private property b: a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled [partially or wholly] by the state 3: a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done."

[Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, Merriam-Webster, p. 1118]
The Supreme Court, in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), stated about the very first income tax instituted by Congress that:

"The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping stone to others larger and more sweeping, until our political contest will become war of the poor against the rich; a war of growing intensity and bitterness.

…

The legislation, in the discrimination it makes, is class legislation. Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest and disturbance in society."
The payment of social benefits to persons not associated with the government under entitlement programs such as Social Security and Welfare invites and encourages the kind of class warfare described above in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
Compelled charity is not charity at all, but slavery disguised as charity.
Social Security is not insurance and are is not a contract as ruled by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
Social Security is Socialism, and that socialism must be voluntary at all times in a free country if liberty is to be preserved.
For the Social Security program to be called voluntary, a participant should be able or at least know how to quit a program at all times and that the agency should not constrain or restrict those who quit or refuse to provide information about how to quit.
The Social Security Administration has no documented means to quit the Social Security program on their website or in any of their publications, and that they will not tell you how to do so if you call their 800 number.
Absent an ability to leave the Social Security program at any time, the program constructively becomes a compulsory/involuntary program for those joined because they are not allowed to quit.
The application for joining Social Security does not indicate that the choice to join in irrevocable.
Most persons who allegedly joined the Social Security program did so when they were not competent adults, and joining was done by the parents and without the consent or assent of the child joining.
Persons whose parents applied for Social Security on their behalf are not offered a choice, upon reaching adulthood, to rescind the application so that their participation is entirely voluntary.
The Enumeration at Birth Program of the Social Security Administration creates the impression at hospitals where babies are born that the obtaining of Social Security numbers for their children is mandatory, and that they make it inconvenient and awkward to refuse receiving a number for their child.
Even though income tax returns require listing social security numbers for children who are dependents in order to claim them as deductions, parents may provide other proof such as a birth certificate in lieu of a social(ist) security number to claim the deduction.
A majority of employers will insist that their employees obtain a Social Security Number as a precondition of employment, and that this makes joining the program compulsory and not mandatory for all practical purposes.
Using the government to plunder the assets of the rich to support the poor using the force of the law is no less extortion or theft because it is called "taxation".

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

THE 16^TH AMEND. DID NOT COME CLOSE TO BEING RATIFIED BY 3/4THS OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 5; THE INCOME TAX IS, THEREFORE, VIOLATIVE OF ART. I, SEC. 9, CL 4

The IRS says it is the 16th Amendment that gives it the authority to impose the income tax directly on the working people of America.(See IRS Publication No. 1918 (July, 96), Cat. No. 22524B ;"The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution states that citizens are required to file tax returns and pay taxes.")

The New York Times says the 16th Amendment is the government’s authority to impose the income tax directly on the working people of America. (See The New York Times Almanac, 2001, The World’s Most Comprehensive and Authoritative Almanac, page 161: "Congress’s right to levy taxes on the income of individuals and corporations was contested throughout the 19th century, but that authority was written into the Constitution with the passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913.")

The federal courts have said the 16th Amendment is the government’s authority to impose the income tax directly on the working people of America. (See United States of America vs. Jerome David Pederson, (1985) Case No. CR-84-57-GF: Judge Paul G. Hatfield (United States District Court For The District of Montana) wrote: "The income tax laws of the United States of America are constitutional, having been validly enacted under authority of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.") (See United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 927 (10th Cir. 1982): the court declared: "The Sixteenth Amendment removed any need to apportion income taxes among the states that otherwise would have been required by Article I, Section 9, clause 4.")

Findings, published in "The Law That Never Was," make a compelling case that the 16th Amendment (the "income tax amendment") was not legally ratified and that Secretary of State Philander Knox was not merely in error, but committed fraud when he declared it ratified in February 1913. (See "The Law That Never Was," by Bill Benson and Red Beckman.)

The U.S. Court of Appeals, in U.S. v. Stahl (1986), 792 F2d 1438, ruled that the claim that ratification of the 16^th Amendment was a fraudulently certified was a political question for Congress to decide because the court could not reach the merits of the claim without expressing a lack of respect due the Congress and the Executive branches of the government. (See U.S. v. Stahl, 792 F2d 1438 )

In 1985, the Congressional Research Service issued a Report, at the request of Congressmen, to address the claim by Bill Benson that the 16^th Amendment was a fraud. (See "Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment," by John Ripy, Esq, CRS 1985, the "Ripy Report").

The Ripy Report was very specific in its declaration that it was not going to address the specific factual allegations detailed in Benson’s book, "The Law That Never Was."

The Ripy Report then went on to assert that the actions of a government official must be presumed to be correct and cannot be judged or overturned by the courts.

When it comes to amending the Constitution the government appears to do whatever it wants to do, making up the rules regarding the ratification process as it goes along, while ignoring the spirit, if not the letter, of Article V of the Constitution.

The 27th Amendment was proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and that the states were allowed 202 years within which to have 3/4^th of the states ratify it, with Maryland ratifying it on December 19, 1789 and New Jersey on 1992 (See 57 FR 21187.) (See Annotations, 27^th Amendment.)

In 1921, in the case of Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374-375, the Supreme Court concluded:

We do not find anything in the article which suggests that an amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the states may be separated from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefore that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in three- fourths of the states, there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do. These considerations and the general purport and spirit of the article lead to the conclusion expressed by Judge Jameson 'that an alteration of the Constitution proposed to-day has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of to-day, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress.' That this is the better conclusion becomes even more manifest when what is comprehended in the other view is considered; for, according to it, four amendments proposed long ago-two in 1789, one in 1810 and one in 1861-are still pending and in a situation where their ratification in some of the states many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively supplemented in enough more states to make three-fourths by representatives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite untenable. We conclude that the fair inference or implication from article 5 is that the ratification must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.

The date of September 25, 1789, when the 27th Amendment was first proposed, is "widely separated in time" from the date of March 6, 1978, when Wyoming ratified this amendment. (See Annotations, 27^th Amendment.)

Pursuant to the United States Constitution, Congress is authorized to impose two different types of taxes: direct taxes and indirect taxes. (See U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 2, clause 3; U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 8, clause 1; U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 9, clause 4.)

The constitutionality of the 1894 income tax act was in question in the case of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff. reh., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), and that in this case, the Supreme Court found that Congress could tax real and personal property only by means of an apportioned, direct tax. Finding that the income from real and personal property was part of the property itself, the Court concluded in this case that a federal income tax could tax such income only by means of an apportioned tax. Further finding that as this particular tax was not apportioned, it was unconstitutional. (See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff. reh., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).)

For Congress to tax today real or personal property, the tax would have to be apportioned among the states. (See U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 9, clause 4)

For Congress to tax income from real and personal property without the authority of the 16th Amendment, such taxes would have to be apportioned among the states. (See U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 9, Clause 4)

In 1913, the following law, Revised Statutes 205, was in effect:

"Sec. 205. Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published in the newspapers authorized to promulgate the laws, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States."

(See R.S. Section 205.)

Revised Statutes Section 205 provided that "official notice" of a State’s ratification of an amendment must be received at the State Department. (See R.S. Section 205)

On or about July 31, 1909, Senate Joint Resolution 40 proposing the ratification of the 16th Amendment was deposited with the Department of State and the same was published at 36 Stat. 184, and that this resolution read as follows:

SIXTY-FIRST CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the fifteenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and nine.

JOINT RESOLUTION.

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution: "Article XVI. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

J.C. CANNON,

Speaker of the House of

Representatives.

J.S. SHERMAN,

Vice-President of the United States,

and President of the Senate.

(See SJ 40, 36 Stat. 184.)

On July 27, 1909, the same Congress adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 6, which read as follows:

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States be requested to transmit forthwith to the executives of the several States of the United States copies of the article of amendment proposed by Congress to the State legislatures to amend the Constitution of the United States, passed July twelfth, nineteen hundred and nine, respecting the power of Congress to lay and collect taxes on incomes, to the end that the said States may proceed to act upon the said article of amendment; and that he request the executive of each State that may ratify said amendment to transmit to the Secretary of State a certified copy of such ratification.

Attest: Charles G. Bennett

Secretary of the Senate

A. McDowell

Clerk of the House of

Representatives

(See Concurrent Resolution)

Not only did this resolution request that certified copies of favorable State ratification resolutions be sent to Washington, D.C., the States were expressly informed to do so by Secretary of State Philander Knox, who sent the following "form" letter to the governors of the 48 States then in the Union:

"Sir:

"I have the honor to enclose a certified copy of a Resolution of Congress, entitled 'Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,' with the request that you cause the same to be submitted to the Legislature of your State for such action as may be had, and that a certified copy of such action be communicated to the Secretary of State, as required by Section 205, Revised Statutes of the United States. (See overleaf.)

An acknowledgment of the receipt of this communication is requested.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

P.C. Knox"

(See copy of "form" letter)

In 1909, there were 48 states and that three-fourths, or 36, of them were required to give their approval in order for it to be ratified. (See Knox’s Proclamation)

Philander Knox declared the 16th amendment ratified on February 25, 1913, naming the following 38 states as having approved it: Alabama, Kentucky, South Carolina, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Maryland, Georgia, Texas, Ohio, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, California, Montana, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, North Dakota, Michigan, Iowa, Missouri, Maine, Tennessee, Arkansas, Wisconsin, New York, South Dakota, Arizona, Minnesota, Louisiana, Delaware, Wyoming, New Jersey and New Mexico. (See Knox’s Proclamation)

When California provided uncertified copies of its resolution to Secretary of State Philander Knox, Knox wrote the following to California Secretary of State Frank Jordan: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, transmitting a copy of the Joint Resolution of the California Legislature ratifying the proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and in reply thereto I have to request that you furnish a certified copy of the Resolution under the seal of the State, which is necessary in order to carry out the provisions of Section 205 of the Revised Statutes of the United States".(See Letter from Knox to Jordan.)

When Wyoming Governor Joseph Carey telegraphed Philander Knox news that the Wyoming legislature had ratified the 16th Amendment on February 3, 1913, Philander Knox telegraphed in return as follows: "Replying to your telegram of 3rd you are requested to furnish a certified copy of Wyoming’s ratification of Income Tax Amendment so there may be no question as to the compliance with Section 205 of Revised Statutes."(See Letter from Knox to Carey)

On February 15, 1913, a State department attorney, J. Rueben Clarke, informed Secretary of State Philander Knox, in reference to the State of Minnesota, "the secretary of the Governor merely informed the Department that the state legislature had ratified the proposed amendment." (See Rueben Clarke Memo)

In the official records deposited in the Archives of the United States, there is no certified copy of the resolution of the Minnesota legislature ratifying the 16th Amendment. (See National Book of state ratification documents: Minnesota)

In the documents possessed by the Archives of the United States, there are no certified copies of the resolutions ratifying the 16th Amendment by California and Kentucky. (See National Book of state ratification documents: California and Kentucky)

The Kentucky Senate voted 22 to 9 against ratification of the 16^th Amendment. (See Kentucky Senate Journal)

Mr. John Ashcroft is currently the Attorney General of the United States.

When Mr. Ashcroft was Governor of Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court rendered the following decision in a case involving Mr. Ashcroft, that case being Ashcroft v. Blunt, 696 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. banc 1985), where the Missouri Supreme Court held:

The senate and the house must agree on the exact text of any bill before they may send it to the governor. There may not be the slightest variance. The exact bill passed by the houses must be presented to and signed by the governor before it may become law (laying aside as not presently material alternative procedure by which a bill may become law without the governor's signature.) The governor has no authority to sign into law a bill which varies in any respect from the bill passed by the houses.

[See Ashcroft v. Blunt, 696 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. banc 1985)]

During hearings regarding the ratification of the 16th Amendment in Massachusetts, Mr. Robert Luce made the following statement to the Massachusetts Committee on Federal Relations: "Question by the committee: Are we able to change it? Mr. Luce: No, you must either accept or reject it." (See "The Law That Never Was," by Bill Benson: Statement by Luce to Committee of Federal Relations.)

On February 11, 1910, Kentucky Governor Augustus Wilson wrote a letter to the Kentucky House of Representatives wherein he stated as follows:

This resolution was adopted without jurisdiction of the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States which had not been transmitted to and was not before the General Assembly, and in this resolution the words "on incomes" were left out of the resolution of the Congress, and if transmitted in this form would be void and would subject the Commonwealth to unpleasant comment and for these reasons and because a later resolution correcting the omission is reported to have passed both Houses, this resolution is returned to the House of Representatives without my approval.

(See Letter from Kentucky Governor Wilson to Kentucky House of Rep.)

No State may change the wording of an amendment proposed by Congress. (See "How Our Laws Are Made") (See Letter from Senator Hollings )

On February 15, 1913, J. Reuben Clarke, an attorney employed by the Department of State, drafted a memorandum to Secretary Knox wherein the following statements were made: "The resolutions passed by twenty-two states contain errors only of capitalization or punctuation, while those of eleven states contain errors in the wording" (page 7). "Furthermore, under the provisions of the Constitution a legislature is not authorized to alter in any way the amendment proposed by Congress, the function of the legislature consisting merely in the right to approve or disapprove the proposed amendment." (See Rueben Clarke Memo.)

The Sixteenth Amendment reads as follows:

"Article XVI. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." (See U.S. Const. amend XVI.)